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Abstract
This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background
against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism.
I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate frag-
ment of the language of thought, and endeavor to show how such algebras
provide the resources necessary to resolve Russell’s paradox of proposi-
tions. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can be regimented
by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic modal al-
gebras are dually isomorphic. I examine, in particular, the virtues unique
to the modal expressivist approach here proffered in the setting of the
foundations of mathematics, by contrast to competing approaches based
upon both the inferentialist approach to concept-individuation and the
codification of speech acts via intensional semantics.
1 Introduction
This essay endeavors to reconcile two approaches to the intensional foundations
of thought: modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. The novel contribution
of the paper is its argument for a reconciliation between the two positions, by
providing a hybrid account in which both internal cognitive architecture, on the
model of epistemic possibilities, as well as modal automata, are accommodated,
while retaining what is supposed to be their unique and inconsistent roles.
Modal cognitivism is the proposal that the internal representations compris-
ing the language of thought can be modeled via a possible world semantics.
Modal expressivism has, in turn, been delineated in two ways. On the first ap-
proach, the presuppositions shared by a community of speakers have been mod-
eled as circumstantial possibilities (cf. Kratzer, 1979; Stalnaker, 1978, 1984).
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Speech acts have in turn been modeled as modal operators, the semantic values
of which are then defined relative to an array of intensional parameters (Stal-
naker, op. cit.; Veltman, 1996; Yalcin, 2007). On the second approach, the
content of concepts is supposed to be individuated via the ability to draw infer-
ences, and the pragmatic abilities of individuals have been modeled as automata
comprised of two transition functions. A counterfactual transition functional –
encoding the recognition of distal properties – determines the range of admis-
sible values for another transition function encoding the individual’s actions
(cf. Brandom, 2008). Inferential conditions constitutive of concept possession
are then taken to have the same counterfactual form as the foregoing functions
(Brandom, 2014), while truth-evaluable descriptions of the automata are spec-
ified in a metalanguage (Brandom, 2008). Both the modal approach to shared
information and the speech acts which serve to update the latter, and the modal-
inferential approach to concept-individuation – are thus consistent with mental
states having semantic values or truth-conditional characterizations.1
So defined, the modal cognitivist and modal expressivist approaches have
been assumed to be in constitutive opposition. While the cognitivist proposal
avails of modal resources in order to model the internal representations com-
prising an abstract language of thought, the expressivist proposal targets infor-
mational properties which extend beyond the remit of internal cognitive archi-
1The notions of cognitivism and expressivism here targeted concern the role of internal –
rather than external – factors in countenancing the nature of thought and information (cf.
Fodor, 1975; Haugeland, 1978). Possible worlds semantics is taken then to provide the most
descriptively adequate means of countenancing the structure of the foregoing. Delineating
cognitivism and expressivism by whether the positions avail of internal representations is thus
orthogonal to the eponymous dispute between realists and antirealists with regard to whether
mental states are truth-apt, i.e., have a representational function, rather than being non-
representational and non-factive, even if real (cf. Dummett, 1959; Blackburn, 1984; Price,
2013). Whereas the type of modal cognitivism examined here assumes that thoughts and
information take exclusively the form of internal representations, the target modal expressivist
proposals assume that information states are exhaustively individuated by both linguistic
behavior and conditions external to the cognitive architecture of agents.
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tecture: both the form and the parameters relevant to determining the semantic
values of linguistic utterances, where the informational common ground is taken
to be reducible to circumstantial possibilities; and the individuation of the con-
tents of concepts on the basis of inferential behavior.
In this paper, I provide a background mathematical theory, in order to ac-
count for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals. I avail,
in particular, of the dual isomorphism between Boolean-valued models of epis-
temic modal algebras and coalgebras; i.e., labeled transition systems defined
in the setting of category theory.2 The functors of coalgebras permit of flexi-
ble interpretations, such that they are able to characterize both modal logics
as well as discrete-state automata. I argue that the correspondence between
epistemic modal algebras and modal coalgebraic automata is sufficient then for
the provision of a mathematically tractable, modal foundation for thought and
action.
In Section 2, I provide the background mathematical theory, in order to
account for the reconciliation of the cognitivist and expressivist proposals.
In Section 3, I provide reasons adducing favor of modal cognitivism, and
argue for the materially adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment
of the language of thought.3 I argue that a further virtue of the proposal is
2For an algebraic characterization of dynamic-epistemic logic, see Kurz and Palmigiano
(2013). Baltag (2003) develops a colagebraic semantics for dynamic-epistemic logic, where
coalgebraic functors are intended to record the informational dynamics of single- and multi-
agent systems. The current approach differs from the foregoing by examining the dual isomor-
phism between static epistemic modal algebras and coalgebraic automata, where the functors
in the latter are interpreted as expressive of the epistemic states comprising the modal alge-
bras.
3The proposal that possible worlds semantics comprises the model for thoughts and propo-
sitions is anticipated by Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 2.15-2.151, 3-3.02); Chalmers (2011); and
Jackson (2011). Their approaches depart, however, from the one here examined in the follow-
ing respects. (i) Wittgenstein (op. cit.: 1-1.1) has been interpreted as endorsing an identity
theory of propositions, which does not distinguish between internal thoughts and external
propositions (cf. McDowell, 1994: 27; and Hornsby, 1997: 1-3). How the identity theory
of propositions is able to accommodate Wittgenstein’s suggestion that a typed hierarchy of
propositions can be generated – only if the class of propositions has a general form and the
sense of propositions over which operations range is invariant by being individuated by the
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that the possible worlds semantics for thought, in which the semantics is mod-
eled algebraically, provides a novel resolution to Russell’s (1903) paradox of
propositions. The correspondence, in particular, between modal operators on
formulas, in the algebra, and monotonic, intensional functions on terms, permits
materially equivalent classes of possibilities to be possessed of distinct, hyper-
intensional arrays of intensions or senses. The application to Russell’s paradox
provides further support for the adequacy of the modal algebraic approach to
countenancing the structure of thought.
Modal coalgebraic automata are argued, finally, to be preferred as models of
modal expressivism, by contrast to the speech-act and inferentialist approaches,
in virtue of the advantages accruing to the model in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics. The interest in modal coalgebraic automata consists, in particular, in the
range of mathematical properties that can be recovered on the basis thereof.4 By
contrast to the above competing approaches to modal expressivism, the functors
of modal coalgebraic automata are able both to model and explain elementary
embeddings in the category of sets; the intensions of mathematical terms; as
well as the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence.
Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
possibilities figuring as their truth and falsity conditions (cf. Wittgenstein, 1979: 21/11/16,
23/11/16, 7/11/17; and Potter, 2009: 283-285 for detailed discussion) – is an open question.
Wittgenstein (1921/1974: 5.5561) writes that ’Hierarchies are and must be independent of
reality’, although provides no account of how the independence can be effected. (ii) Jackson
(2008: 48-50) distinguishes between personal and subpersonal theories by the role of neural
science in individuating representational states (cf. Shea, 2013, for further discussion), and
argues in favor of a ’personal-level implicit theory’ for the possible worlds semantics of mental
representations. (iii) Chalmers (2012: 462-463) argues for a hybrid cognitivist-expressivist
approach, according to which epistemic intensions – i.e. functions from epistemically possible
worlds to extensions – are individuated by their inferential roles.
4See Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-6, 11, 30-31), for a prescient expressivist approach to the
modal profile of mathematical formulas.
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2 The Hybrid Proposal
2.1 Epistemic Modal Algebra
In Epistemic Modal Algebra, a topological Boolean algebra, A, is formed by
taking the powerset of a topological space, X; A = P(X). The domain of A
is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with names – assigned to
elements of P(X), where the formula-terms encode epistemic possibilities; i.e.,
possibilities defined relative to states of information. The top element of the
algebra is denoted ’1’ and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We interpret the
modal operators, f(x), – i.e., monotonic intensional functions in the algebra – as
both equivalent to concepts, as well as countenancing the property of topological
interiority. An Epistemic Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the form, F =
〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points in the topological space to
elements or regions of the algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X) → A. A
model over the Epistemic-Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic structure has
the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).5 For all
xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
5See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further details.
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V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).
An abstraction principle for epistemic intensions can be defined as follows:
For all types, A,B, there is a homotopy:
H := [(f ∼ g) :≡
∏
x:A(f(x) = g(x)], where
∏
f :A→B[(f ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ h → f ∼ h)],
such that, via Voevodsky’s (2006) Univalence Axiom, for all type families
A,B:U, there is a function:
idtoeqv : (A =U B) → (A ≃ B),
which is itself an equivalence relation:
(A =U B) ≃ (A ≃ B).
Abstraction principles for intensional computational properties take, then,
the form:
• ∀A,B∃f,g[
∏
f :A→BAf(x) = Ag(x)] ≃ [f(x) ≃ g(x)],
with A an abstraction operator from the domain of functions to a domain
of abstract objects.
2.2 Modal Coalgebraic Automata
Modal coalgebraic automata can be thus characterized. Let a category C be
comprised of a class Ob(C) of objects and a family of arrows for each pair of
objects C(A,B) (Venema, 2007: 421). A functor from a category C to a category
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D, E: C → D, is an operation mapping objects and arrows of C to objects and
arrows of D (422). An endofunctor on C is a functor, E: C → C (op. cit.).
A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to as the
carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the transition
map of A (390).
As, further, a coalgebraic model of modal logic, A can be defined as follows
(407):
For a set of formulas, Φ, let ∇Φ := 
∨
Φ ∧
∧
⋄Φ, where ⋄Φ denotes the
set {⋄φ | φ∈Φ} (op. cit.). Then,
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let, then, an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, be such that S,s 
∇Φ if and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.).
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can finally be thus defined
(391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the state
space of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is the coding
for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties of the natural
numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A is the collection of
admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A → 1 if a∈F and A
→ 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.).
The crux of the reconciliation between algebraic models of cognitivism and
the formal foundations of modal expressivism is based on the dual isomorphism
between categories of algebras and coalgebras: A = 〈A, α:A → E(A)〉 is dually
isomorphic to the category of algebras over the functor α (417-418). For a
category C, object A, and endofunctor E, define a new arrow, α, s.t. α:EA →
A. A homomorphism, f , can further be defined between algebras 〈A, α〉, and
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〈B, β〉. Then, for the category of algebras, the following commutative square
can be defined: (i) EA → EB (Ef); (ii) EA → A (α); (iii) EB → B (β); and
(iv) A → B (f) (cf. Hughes, 2001: 7-8). The same commutative square holds
for the category of coalgebras, such that the latter are defined by inverting the
direction of the morphisms in both (ii) [A → EA (α)], and (iii) [B → EB (β)]
(op. cit.).6
The significance of the foregoing is twofold. First and foremost, the above
demonstrates how a formal correspondence can be effected between algebraic
models of cognition and coalgebraic models which provide a natural setting for
modal logics and automata. The second aspect of the philosophical significance
of modal colagebraic automata is that – as a model of modal expressivism –
the proposal is able to countenance fundamental properties in the foundations
of mathematics, and circumvent the issues accruing to the attempt so to do by
the competing expressivist approaches.
3 Discussion
3.1 Material Adequacy
The material adequacy of epistemic modal algebras as a fragment of the rep-
resentational theory of mind is witnessed by the prevalence of possible worlds
semantics – the model theory for which is algebraic (cf. Blackburn et al., 2001:
ch. 5) – in cognitive psychology, and the convergences thereof with theoretical
physics.
In Bayesian perceptual psychology, e.g., the visual system is presented with
6Note that the theory for the model will be a topological coalgebra – cf. Takeuchi, 1985 for
further discussion – and that, unlike isomorphism, the property of being dually isomorphic is
not one-one (cf. Hughes, op. cit.: 13). Dual isomorphisms are thus more akin to bisimulations
(cf. Blackburn et al., 2001: 64-66).
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a prior distribution of possibilities concerning the direction of a source of light.
The set of possibilities is pointed, as the visual system calculates the likelihood
that one of the possibilities is actual, and places a condition thereby on the
accuracy of the attribution of properties – such as boundedness and volume –
to distal particulars (cf. Mamassian et al., 2000).
In the philosophy of physics, modal notions play, further, an ineliminable
role in physical ontology and in the theoretical and observational characteri-
zations thereof. Transition functions in quantum information theory can, for
example, be interpreted counterfactually, in order to countenance the possible
transformations of systems, the inputs of which include the expectation values
of spin-state vectors (Deutsch, 2013). In the interpretation of physical theories,
Ruetsche (2011: 9) argues, further, that ’[T]o interpret a physical theory is to
characterize the worlds possible according to that theory’. She notes that the
interpretation of a physical theory falls into two phases, both of which constitu-
tively involve modal notions. The first phase consists in the specification of the
possible states of the models at issue; the possible values taken with regard to
the observable kinematics thereof, e.g., the expectation values of Hilbert oper-
ators; and then the laws comprising the dynamic transformations therein (op.
cit.). The second phase targets the nomologically possible worlds in which the
properties of the first phase of interpretation are satisfied (op. cit.). In quantum
field theory, unital algebras are availed of, as well, where the algebras are closed
under commutativity and associativity; scalar multiplication by complex num-
bers, such that for all vectors A,B, and complex numbers cn: c1(A + B) = c1A
+ c1B; (c1 + c2)A = c1A + c2A; c1(c2A) = (c1c2)A; (c1A)B - A(c1B) = c1(AB);
and multiplicative identity, i.e., for an element I, AI = IA = A (74). Finally,
Belot (2011) argues that – in the dispute between relationalist and substantival-
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ist conceptions of spatial geometry – a relationalist proposal can be proffered,
according to which – by analogy with nomological possibilities – the different
metric relations that can be grounded in the intrinsic points comprising spatial
regions are geometric possibilities.
In the next subsection, I endeavor to avail of the formal properties of epis-
temic modal algebras, in order to resolve Russell’s (op. cit.) paradox of proposi-
tions. I argue that the paradox can be resolved in virtue of the formal correspon-
dence, in the modal algebras characterizing the language of thought, between
modal operators on formulas and monotonic intensional functions on terms.
3.2 The Paradox of Propositions
Russell’s paradox is as follows. Let there be two classes, m and n, of equal
cardinality, where classes are aggregations of non-sets. Define a proposition, ζ,
such that ζ says of m that all the propositions defined therein are true. Then ζ
is true of m, but not of n; so |m| 6= |n| (§500, 2; cf. Uzquiano, 2015a: 288).
In response, Russell (op. cit.: 500, 3) suggests that the logical product of
the propositions comprising m should itself be codified by the proposition, η,
i.e. that ’All the propositions in m are true’. η and ζ are, according to the
proposal, thus materially equivalent; and thus cardinalities of m and n would
subsequently remain equivalent, as well. However, Russell’s objection to the
purported equivalence of the above propositions is the difference exhibited by
their senses (§500, 4).
The objection to the resolution can be readily addressed. In Boolean Al-
gebras with Operators, operators in the algebras are functions of rank > 0,
satisfying conditions on normality, additivity, and monotonicity (cf. Blackburn
et al., op. cit.: 277-278). For term variables, x,y, normality states that f(x) =
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x, while additivity states that f(x) + f(y) = f(x + y) (277). Monotonicity states
that, if a ≤ b, then θa ≤ θb. Because ’a ≤ b’ iff ’a • b = a’ iff ’a + b = b’, then
f(a) + f(b) = f(a +b) = f(b); so, f(a) ≤ f(b) (278). The intensional properties
of the Boolean functions are witnessed by their correspondence to the following
modal formulas:
f(0) = 0 7→ ⋄⊥ ⇐⇒ ⊥;
f(x) + f(y) = f(x + y) 7→ ⋄(p ∨ q) ⇐⇒ ⋄p ∨ ⋄q; and,
⊢ p → q 7→ ⊢ ⋄p → ⋄q (277-288).
The correspondence between modal operators on formulas and intensional
functions on terms permits interpretations of the former – e.g., that it is conceiv-
able that a situation obtains – to be equivalent to an intensional function – i.e.,
a concept – which can itself figure within, and be concatenated so as to form,
distinct propositions. Then, while η and ζ are materially equivalent possibili-
ties, or propositions, their equivalence to monotonic algebraic functions permits
them to be reconfigured as intensions or concepts, which can themselves figure
as the components of sense in arrays for which the variance in sequential compo-
sition will entrain unique classes of propositions. So, η and ζ can be materially
equivalent propositions as possibilities, while – in virtue of their modal-algebraic
functional analogues – having different values in hyperintensional contexts.7
A generalized version of the paradox of propositions can be similarly treated
7Whittle (2009) provides two versions of Russell’s paradox of propositions, in a setting of a
discussion of the interaction between propositions and epistemic modality. The first variation
corresponds to the presentation above (op. cit.: 273-274); and can thus be similarly treated.
The second variation is engendered by considering two classes of worlds, where a proposition
unique to each class can be countenanced either via being known apriori (275-276); being
centered yet not known apriori, where a centered world is an epistemic possibility whose value
is defined relative to a context ranging over an individual and time (277-278; see Quine (1968:
17) for the introduction of centered worlds); or by – as on Kaplan’s (1995: 43) paradox –
there being an agent who bears an attitude toward a particular world in one of the two classes
(278-279). Whittle notes that it is indeterminate which propositions are ruled out apriori
(276). In the latter two variations on the paradox, it is unclear, however, why designating a
world in one of the two classes, either via centering or bearing an attitude such as querying
it, ought to bear on the cardinality of the class, and thus on whether the cardinality of the
two classes are equivalent.
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(Uzquiano, op. cit.: 290). Let a class, τ , be maximal, if and only if for all
propositions α in τ , either ’α’ := p or ’α’ := ¬p. For a maximal class, M,
of propositions, let a subclass, m, therein have cardinality k. Let there be a
distinct subclass, n, of equal cardinality, k. Define, then, a proposition, φ, in m
which states that – for a distinct proposition ψ in n – either ’ψ’ := p or ’ψ’ :=
¬p. Then, given that φ is unique to m, |m| 6= |n|.
In response, a proposition, ϑ, can be added to n, where ϑ states that there
is a proposition in m which characterizes the maximality condition. Then,
the addition of the propositions, φ and ϑ, unique to each of m and n, would
ensure that m and n remain possessed of the same cardinality. The response
to Russell’s objection can then be simulated as above. While φ and ϑ are
equivalent propositions which codify the thought that the maximality condition
obtains in the corresponding model, the status thereof as possibilities permits
the modalities to be interpreted as intensional functions, the compositions of
which entraining unique hyperintensional ingredient senses.
In the the remainder of the paper, I endeavor to demonstrate the advan-
tages accruing to the present approach to countenancing modal expressivism
via modal colagebraic automata, via a comparison of the theoretical strength of
the proposal when applied to characterizing the fundamental properties of the
foundations of mathematics, by contrast to the competing approaches to modal
expressivism and the limits of their applications thereto.
3.3 Modal Expressivism and the Philosophy of Mathe-
matics
When modal expressivism is modeled via speech acts on a common ground
of presuppositions, the application thereof to the foundations of mathematics is
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limited both (i) by the manner in which necessary propositions are characterized,
as well as (ii) by the metalinguistc – rather than, e.g., epistemic – interpretation
of the semantics.8
Because for example a proposition is taken, according to the proposal, to be
identical to a set of possible worlds, all necessarily true mathematical formulas
can only express a single proposition; namely, the set of all possible worlds (cf.
Stalnaker, 1978; 2003: 51). Thus, although distinct set-forming operations will
be codified by distinct axioms of a language of set theory, the axioms will be
assumed to express the same proposition: The axiom of Pairing in set theory
– which states that a unique set can be formed by combining an element from
each of two extant sets: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b) – will be supposed to
express the same proposition as the Power Set axiom – which states that a set
can be formed by taking the set of all subsets of an extant set: ∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒
u⊆a). However, that distinct operations – i.e., the formation of a set by selecting
elements from two extant sets, by contrast to forming a set by collecting all of
the subsets of a single extant set – are characterized by the different axioms is
readily apparent.
Stalnaker endeavors to redress the objection by availing of the metaseman-
tic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics, according to which
the necessarily true propositions comprising the common ground are yet con-
sistent with contingently valued speech acts – e.g., assertions – about those
8See Author (ms) for an application of the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional
intensional semantics to account for the modal profile of Orey sentences; i.e. mathematical
propositions that are undecidable relative to the axioms of a given language. (For the ori-
gins of multi-dimensional intensional semantics, see Kamp, 1967; Vlach, 1973; and Segerberg,
1973.) The distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, as they pertain to
the values of mathematical formulas, is anticipated by Gödel’s (1951: 11-12) distinction be-
tween mathematics in its subjective and objective senses, where the former concerns decidable
formulas, and the latter records the values of formulas defined, owing to the incompleteness
theorems, in a variant of the language augmented by stronger axioms of infinity. Axioms of
infinity take the form, ’∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)’, and record closure on the singleton of a
real in the cumulative hierarchy of sets, where the real can be a large cardinal.
13
propositions (2003: 54). Although it does record a difference in the epistemic
status of agents with regard to whether they know or believe the propositions
at issue, the proposal is yet not itself sufficient to distinguish between the senses
of distinct, albeit necessarily true formulas.
Further, the metalinguistic interpretation of the semantics places a restric-
tion on the expressive capacity of the mathematical languages at issue. By
contrast to the objectual interpretation of the quantifiers, the metalinguistc in-
terpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics – by restricting itself
to the remit of natural language semantics – is limited to substitutional quan-
tification; i.e. to quantification over only those objects for which a name, in
the natural language, has been specified (op. cit.). Given, however, the above
restriction, substitutional quantification cannot account for impredicative com-
prehension; i.e., for the specification of extensions of terms, with reference to
the totality of items of the type that the terms are intended to designate.
By contrast to the limits of Stalnaker’s approach to modal expressivism,
differences in the senses of formulas can, as noted, be recorded by the corre-
spondence, in modal algebras, between modal operators and intensional func-
tions, such that the senses of materially equivalent propositions-as-possibilities
can shift when the possibilities are translated as intensions and figure within
hyperintensional contexts. Further, both epistemic modal algebras and their
dually corresponding modal coalgebraic automata permit of unrestricted objec-
tual quantification, and are thus unconfined to the expressive limitations of the
substitutional quantifiers of natural language.
A variation of Stalnaker’s semantics is proffered in Yalcin (2016). Yalcin
(op. cit.) argues that concepts and beliefs can be modeled in the manner of
subject matters (cf. Lewis, 1998; Yablo, 2014), where the latter are interrogative
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updates on a background set of epistemically possible worlds, and the inquiry
whether φ induces a focus on a subset of worlds which answer whether φ. In
the setting of philosophy of mathematics, however, it is unclear how identifying
subject matters with fragments of an epistemic modal space induced by inter-
rogative updates can model the nature of, inter alia, Orey sentences such as the
generalized continuum hypothesis (i.e., ℵα
ℵα = ℵα + 1),
whose values are indeterminate relative to the present axioms of ZF set
theory with choice, and the reduction in the incompleteness of which depends
upon augmenting the relevant mathematical languages with stronger axioms of
infinity (cf. Woodin, 2010). In order to determine the truth-values of Orey sen-
tences, the space of epistemic modality might require an expanding domain by
way of which the new axioms and their corresponding theorems can be accom-
modated. It is thus unclear how a treatment of subject matters as an induced
restriction on the space of epistemic possibilities – i.e., as interrogative-induced
operations from a set of possibilities to any particular subset thereof – could
begin to account for the required expansion in epistemic states.
Thomasson (2007) argues for a version of modal expressivism which she
refers to as ’modal normativism’, according to which alethic modalities are to
be replaced by deontic modalities taking the form of object-language, modal in-
dicative conditionals (op. cit.: 136, 138, 141). The modal indicative conditionals
serve to express constitutive rules pertaining, e.g., to ontological dependencies
which state that: ’Necessarily, if an entity satisfying a property exists then a
distinct entity satisfying a property exists’ (143-144), and generalizes to other
expressions, such as analytic conditionals which state, e.g., that: ’Necessarily, if
an entity satisfies a property, such as being a bachelor, then the entity satisfies
a distinct yet co-extensive property, such as being unmarried’ (148). A virtue of
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Thomasson’s interpretation of modal indicative conditionals as expressing both
analytic and ontological dependencies is that it would appear to converge with
the ’If-thenist’ proposal in the philosophy of mathematics. ’If-thenism’ is an ap-
proach according to which, if an axiomatized mathematical language is consis-
tent, then (i) one can either bear epistemic attitudes, such as fictive acceptance,
toward the target system (cf. Leng, 2010: 180) or (ii) the system (possibly)
exists [cf. Russell (op. cit.: §1); Hilbert (1899/1980: 39); Menger (1930/1979:
57); Putnam (1967); Shapiro (2000: 95); Chihara (2004: Ch. 10); and Awodey
(2004: 60-61)].9 However, there are at least two issues for the modal normativist
approach in the setting of the philosophy of mathematics. One general issue for
the proposal is that the treatment of quantification remains unaddressed, given
that there are translations from modal operators, such as figure in modal indica-
tives, into existential and universal quantifiers.10 A second issue for the norma-
tive indicative conditional approach is that Thomasson’s normative modalities
are unimodal. They are thus not sufficiently fine-grained to capture distinctions
such as Gödel’s (op. cit.) between mathematics in its subjective and objective
9See Leng (2009), for further discussion. Field (1980/2016: 11-21; 1989: 54-65, 240-
241) argues in favor of the stronger notion of conservativeness, according to which consistent
mathematical theories must be satisfiable by internally consistent theories of physics. More
generally, for a class of assertions, A, comprising a theory of fundamental physics, and a class of
sentences comprising a mathematical language, M, any sentences derivable from A+M ought to
be derivable from A alone. Another variation on the ’If-thenist’ proposal is witnessed in Field
(2001: 333-338), who argues that the existence of consistent forcing extensions of set-theoretic
ground models adduces in favor of there being a set-theoretic pluriverse, and thus entrains
indeterminacy in the truth-values of undecidable sentences. For a similar proposal, which
emphasizes the epistemic role of examining how instances of undecidable sentences obtain
and fail so to do relative to forcing extensions in the set-theoretic pluriverse, see Hamkins
(2012: §7).
10The formal correspondence between modalities and quantifiers is anticipated by Aristotle
(De Interpretatione, 9; De Caelo, I.12), who defines the metaphysical necessity of a proposition
as its being true at all times. For detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory, see Waterlow
(1982). For a contemporary account of the multi-modal logic for metaphysical and temporal
modalities, see Dorr and Goodman (ms). For contemporary accounts of the correspondence
between modal operators and quantifiers see von Wright (1952/1957), where von Wright
anticipates Kripke’s (1963) relational semantics for modal logic; Montague (1960/1974: 75);
Lewis (1975/1998; 1981/1998); Kratzer (op. cit.; 1981/2012); and Kuhn (1980).
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senses.11 Further distinctions between the types of mathematical modality can
be delineated which permit epistemic types of mathematical possibility to serve
as a guide as to whether a formula is metaphysically mathematically possible.12
The convergence between epistemic and metaphysical mathematical modalities
can be countenanced via a multi-dimensional intensional semantics. Thus, by
eschewing alethic modalities for unimodal, normative indicatives, the normative
modalities are unable to account for the relation between the alethic interpre-
tation of modality and, e.g., logical mathematical modalities treated as consis-
tency operators on languages (cf. Field, 1989: 249-250, 257-260; Leng: 2007;
2010: 258), or for the convergence between epistemic possibilities concerning
decidability and their bearing on the metaphysical modal status of undecidable
sentences.
According, finally, to Brandom’s (op. cit.) modal expressivist approach,
terms are individuated by their rules of inference, where the rules are taken
to have a modal profile translatable into the counterfactual forms taken by
the transition functions of automata (cf. Brandom, 2008: 142). In order to
countenance the metasemantic truth-conditions for the object-level, pragmatic
abilities captured by the automata’s counterfactual transition states, Brandom
augments a first-order language comprised of a stock of atomic formulas with an
incompatibility function (141). An incompatibility function, I, is defined as the
incoherence of the union of two sentences, where incoherence is a generalization
of the notion of inconsistency to nonlogical vocabulary.
x ∪ y ∈ Inc ⇐⇒ x ∈ I(y) (141-142).
11See footnote 8.
12See Author (ms), for further discussion. A precedent is Reinhardt (1974: 199-200), who
proposes the use of imaginary sets, classes, and projections, as ’imaginary experiments’ (204),
in order to ascertain the consequences of accepting new axioms for ZF which might account
for the reduction of the incompleteness of Orey sentences. See Maddy (1988,b), for critical
discussion.
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Incompatibility is supposed to be a modal notion, such that the union of
the two sentences is incompossible (126). A sentence, β is an incompatibility-
consequence, I , of a sentence, α, iff there is no sequence of sentences, <γ1, . . . ,
γn>, such that it can be the case that α I <γ1, . . . , γn>, yet not be the case
that β I <γ1, . . . , γn> (125). To be incompatible with a necessary formula
is to be compatible with everything that does not entail the formula (129-130).
Dually, to be incompatible with a possible formula is to be incompatible with
everything compatible with something compatible with the formula (op. cit.).
There are at least two, general issues for the application of Brandom’s modal
expressivism to the foundations of mathematics.
The first issue is that the mathematical vocabulary – e.g., the set-membership
relation, ∈ – is axiomatically defined. I.e., the membership relation is defined by,
inter alia, the Pairing and Power Set axioms of set-theoretic languages. Thus,
mathematical terms have their extensions individuated by the axioms of the
language, rather than via a set of inference rules that can be specified in the
absence of the mention of truth values. Even, furthermore, if one were to avail
of modal notions in order to countenance the intensions of the mathematical
vocabulary at issue – i.e., functions from terms in intensional contexts to their
extensions – the modal profile of the intensions is orthogonal to the properties
encoded by the incompatibility function. Fine (2006) avails, e.g., of a dynamic
logic in order to countenance the possibility of reinterpreting the intensions
at issue, and of thus accounting for variance in the range of the domains of
quantifier expressions. The dynamic possibilities are specified as operational
conditions on tracking increases in the size of the cardinality of the universe
(Fine, 2005). Uzquiano (2015b) argues that it is always possible to reinterpret
the intensions of non-logical vocabulary, as one augments one’s language with
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stronger axioms of infinity and climbs thereby farther up the cumulative hierar-
chy of sets. The reinterpretations of, e.g., the concept of set are effected by the
addition of new large cardinal axioms, which stipulate the existence of larger
inaccessible cardinals. However, it is unclear how the incompatibility function –
i.e., a modal operator defined via Boolean negation and a generalized condition
on inconsistency – might similarly be able to model the intensions pertaining to
the ontological expansion of the cumulative hierarchy.
The second issue is that the truth-conditional formulas in the metalanguage
of Brandom’s modal expressivist semantics are not compositional. I.e., it is
not the case of the clauses in the metalanguage that their truth-conditions are
formed by the composition of the semantic values of their component expres-
sions. While the formulas are recursively formed – because the decomposition
of complex formulas into atomic formulas is decidable although computationally
infeasible – formulas in the language are not compositional, because they fail to
satisfy the subformula property to the effect that the value of a logically com-
plex formula is calculated as a function of the values of the component logical
connectives applied to subformulas therein (135).13
By contrast to the limits of Brandom’s approach to modal expressivism,
modal coalgebraic automata can circumvent both of the issues mentioned in the
foregoing. In response to the first issue, concerning the axiomatic individuation
and intensional profiles of mathematical terms, functors of modal coalgebraic
automata can be interpreted in order to provide a precise delineation of the
intensions of the target vocabulary [cf. Author (ms). In response, finally, to the
second of the above issues, the values taken by modal coalgebraic automata are
both decidable and computationally feasible, while the dual isomorphism of co-
13Let a decision problem be a propositional function which is feasibly decidable, if it is a
member of the polynomial time complexity class; i.e., if it can be calculated as a polynomial
function of the size of the formula’s input (cf. Dean, 2015).
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lagebras to Boolean-valued models of modal algebras ensures that the formulas
therein retain their compositionality. The decidability of colagebraic automata
can further be witnessed by the role of modal coalgebras in countenancing the
modal profile of Ω-logical consequence, where – given a proper class of Woodin
cardinals – the values of mathematical formulas can remain invariant through-
out extensions of the ground models comprising the set-theoretic pluriverse (cf.
Woodin, 2010; Author, ms). The individuation of large cardinals can further be
characterized by the functors of modal coalgebraic automata, when the latter
are interpreted so as to countenance the elementary embeddings constitutive of
large cardinal axioms in the category of sets.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have endeavored to account for a mathematically tractable back-
ground against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism.
I availed, to that end, of the dual isomorphism between epistemic modal alge-
bras and modal coalgebraic automata. Epistemic modal algebras were shown
to comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought, given
that models thereof figure in both the cognitive, as well as in the interpretations
of the physical, sciences. A further virtue of such algebras is that they provide
the resources necessary to resolve Russell’s paradox of propositions. The elision
of the elements in the algebra permits epistemic modal operators on formulas
to correspond to monotonic intensional functions as concepts, where the lat-
ter can then be concatenated in hyperintensional arrays of intensions in order
to yield new propositions. It was then shown how the approach to modal ex-
pressivism here proffered, as regimented by the modal coalgebraic automata to
which the epistemic modal algebras are isomorphic, avoids the pitfalls attending
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the competing modal expressivist approaches based upon both the inferential-
ist approach to concept-individuation and the approach to codifying the speech
acts in natural language via intensional semantics. The present modal expres-
sivist approach was shown, e.g., to avoid the limits of the foregoing in the
philosophy of language, as they concerned the status of necessary propositions;
substitutional quantification; the inapplicability of inferentialist-individuation
to mathematical vocabulary; and failures of compositionality. Countenancing
modal expressivism via modal coalgebraic automata was shown, then, to be able
to account for both the intensions of mathematical terms and possible reinter-
pretations thereof; for the modal profile of Ω-logical consequence in the category
of sets; and for the elementary embeddings constitutive of large cardinal axioms
in set-theoretic languages.
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